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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

VICTOR HERNANDEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20090080-SC

:
Appellant is incarcerated

ARGUMENT
In its response, the State abandons the issues raised below and argued in the Brief
of Appellant, and instead raises two new issues which it argues support the district
court’s denial of Mr. Hernandez’s request for a preliminary hearing.
First, the State argues that article I, section 13 (hereinafter art. I, §13), of the Utah
Constitution refers exclusively to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America, meaning that because class A misdemeanors are not indictable
offenses under the federal Constitution, they are not governed by art. I, §13. Br. of
Appellee, at 4-6. Next, the State argues, in the alternative, that the probable cause
statement included with informations satisfies the state constitutional requirement for a
preliminary hearing. Id. at 6.
These arguments ignore a basic principle of constitutional law and the plain text of
our State Constitution. An analysis of the issues raised by the State will show that the
State’s arguments are without merit.

Because the State’s response has raised issues which were not considered in the
Brief of Appellant, Mr. Hernandez’s reply brief will only focus on these new issues.
Although the focus of the issue has changed, the issues argued in Mr. Hernandez’s
response, and in his original brief, provide this Court with the controlling analysis and
interpretation of art. I, §13, which requires a reversal of the district court’s final order
which denied Mr. Hernandez’s request for a preliminary hearing.
I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 13, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, REFERS TO
UTAH TERRITORIAL LAW, THEREBY REQUIRING PRELIMINARY
HEARINGS TO BE HELD IN ALL CASES OF CLASS A MISDEMEANORS
PROSECUTED BY INFORMATION
To clarify the first issue raised by the State, that art. I, §13, of the Utah
Constitution refers to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a brief
analysis of the development of Utah’s territorial laws, and their interaction with the
United States Constitution, is necessary.
It is well settled that the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land,
providing the floor below which protections may not fall, not the ceiling. U.S. v. Seljan,
547 F.3d 993, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (Callahan concurring). As such, Congress remains
free to provide greater statutory protections than those contemplated by the Constitution.
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18 (vesting in Congress the power to make all laws necessary
and proper for executing all powers Congress is vested by the United States
Constitution). 1

1

See also Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006) (Congress passed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 “to afford [inmates] greater
protection of religious exercise than what the Constitution itself affords”); U.S. v. Jones,
2

The State’s response fails to consider this well-settled principle of constitutional
law.
The power to make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States” was vested in Congress by the Untied
States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV, §3, cl. 2. Acting under this power, on September
9, 1850, the United States Congress passed “An Act to establish a territorial Government
for Utah” (hereinafter Organic Act). 31st Cong. Sess. I, ch. 51, 9 Stat. 453 (1850). The
Organic Act vested the legislative power for the Territory of Utah in a governor and
legislative assembly. See Organic Act, Section IV. 2 This legislative power “extend[ed]
to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the Constitution of the United States
and the provisions of this act.” Id. at VI.
All laws passed by the territorial legislative assembly and governor were required
to “be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and if disapproved [were] null and
of no effect.” Id. Any enactment of Utah’s territorial legislature was, therefore,
susceptible of being disapproved by Congress and rendered invalid; but, if an enactment
was not disapproved by Congress, then it was valid, so long as it did not conflict with the

410 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1030-1031 (D.N.M. 2005) (Congress may afford greater protection
to a defendant’s right to be present at sentencing, but not allow certain types of waiver,
whereas the Constitution might not prohibit it); U.S. v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 698 (4th
Cir. 1982) (The Sixth Amendment, however, merely secures certain minimal trial rights
against encroachment by government. In no way does it prevent Congress from according
the accused more protection than the Constitution requires, nor does it preclude Congress
from acting on the public's interest in speedy justice).
2
The Organic Act may be found at the following address:
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/uthisstat&CISOPTR=448
&REC=3
3

United States Constitution or federal legislation. State v. Norman, 52 P. 986, 988 (Utah
1898).
The laws of the Territory of Utah, compiled by the territorial legislature in 1888
and published as the Compiled Laws of Utah, Volume I and II, were, therefore, passed
with the approval of the United States Congress. Id.; Organic Act, Section IV. These
territorial laws added to existing constitutional protections, and created the legal
framework for the Territory and State of Utah. Norman, 52 P. at 988; see also Utah
const. art. XXIV, §2 (territorial laws in force in 1896, which were not “repugnant” to
Utah’s Constitution, were required to remain in force until they expired, or were altered
or repealed by the state legislature).
Among the protections expanded by Utah’s territorial legislature was the federal
constitutional requirement that “capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s]” be prosecuted
by indictment. U.S. Const. amend. V. Under territorial law, all offenses punishable by a
fine of more than three hundred dollars, imprisonment of more than six months, or both,
were required to be prosecuted by indictment. Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. II, §4783
s.3 (1888) (Every public offense must be prosecuted by indictment, except: [o]ffenses
triable in justices’ and police courts) 3; id. at §3023(3) (justice and police courts had
jurisdiction over “all misdemeanors punishable by a fine less than three hundred dollars,

3

Volume I of the 1888 Compiled Laws of Utah may be found at the following address:
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/uthisstat&CISOPTR=5872
&REC=10
Volume II of the 1888 Compiled Laws of Utah may be found at the following address:
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/uthisstat&CISOPTR=4150
&REC=11
4

or imprisonment in the county jail or city prison not exceeding six months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment”). This requirement not only encompassed felonies, as
required by the Fifth Amendment, but also included some misdemeanors, commonly
referred to as “high”, “gross”, or “indictable” misdemeanors. Blacks Law Dictionary,
841, 1089 (9th ed. 2009). This class of misdemeanors is known as class A misdemeanors
under current Utah law.
When Utah’s Constitution was drafted in 1895, it was done with the intent “to
make the government for the state complete and operative from the very time of the
taking effect of the Constitution.” State v. Lewis, 72 P. 388, 390 (Utah 1903). To do so,
the drafters of Utah’s Constitution unequivocally decreed that “[a]ll laws in the Territory
of Utah now in force, not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they
expire by their own limitations, or are altered or repealed by the Legislature.” Utah
Const. art. XXIV, §2.
This decree includes territorial laws of criminal procedure which mandated that
“indictable,” or class A, misdemeanors be prosecuted by indictment.
In spite of this clear decree, the State claims that art. I, §13, ignores the territorial
requirements so prominently featured in article XXIV, section 2, of the Utah
Constitution, and instead refers to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
a document penned more than a century before the creation of Utah’s Constitution.
Analysis of the plain meaning of art. I, §13, its historical context, and this Court’s
analysis of this provision show that the State’s argument is without merit.

5

a. The plain text of article 1, section 13, refers to Utah Territorial law,
thereby requiring preliminary hearings to be held in all cases of class A
misdemeanors prosecuted by information.
“It is a cardinal rule of construction that constitutions should be construed in light
of their framers’ intent.” American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah
1985). In doing so, “the starting point should always be the plain meaning of the textual
language.” American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶115, 140 P.3d 1235
(Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). This analysis
should include the provision in question as well as “other [related] constitutional
provisions.” West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994).
An analysis of the plain meaning of art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution, as well as
related constitutional provisions, shows that art. I, §13, built upon existing territorial
requirements for the prosecution of indictable offenses by giving prosecutors the option
of prosecuting felonies and “indictable misdemeanors” by information.
Art. I, §13, states that “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate . . ..” The phrase “[o]ffenses heretofore required,” as used in art. I, §13, is
tellingly different from the phrase historically used to refer to felonies: “[C]apital or other
infamous crimes.” Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886) (“Infamous
crimes” are defined as crimes “punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary”) (citation
omitted). See also U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury”). Rather than limiting itself to felonies, the plain meaning of art. I, §13, embraces a
6

wider variety of crimes than simply felonies, and explicitly directs readers to consider
laws governing the Territory of Utah.
Art. I, §13, begins with the word “offenses.” Offenses does not just restrict itself
to felonies but “may comprehend every crime and misdemeanor, or may be used in a
specific sense as synonymous with ‘felony’ or with ‘misdemeanor,’ as the case may be . .
.” 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §3, at 4 (1989). Offenses encompasses all violations of the
law, “often [minor ones]” Blacks Law Dictionary 1186 (9th ed. 2009).
Art. I, §13, then directs the reader to consider all requirements existing when our
State Constitution was ratified by using the word “heretofore,” defined as “[u]p to now;
before this time.” Id. at 795. With these definitions in mind, art. I, §13, may be read as
follows: “’[V]iolation[s] of the law,’ including minor ones, ‘[u]p to now, [or] before this
time’ required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information . . .”
Id. at 1186, 795.
In order to create continuity between the laws of the Territory of Utah and State of
Utah, while giving prosecutors the option of prosecuting cases by information (an option
only available to states), art. I, §13, codified existing territorial requirements regarding
the prosecution of criminal cases in the Territory of Utah, and gave prosecutors the
ability to now prosecute these cases by information or indictment.
This conclusion is supported by other related constitutional provisions which also
refer readers to territorial laws. Article VIII, section 8, for example, required a
consideration of territorial laws when determining the jurisdiction of justice courts by
stating that “[t]he jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be as now provided by law . .
7

.” Utah Const. art. VIII, §8 (amended 1984). Additionally, article XXIV, section 2, of
the Utah Constitution, states that “[a]ll laws in the Territory of Utah now in force, not
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own
limitations, or are altered or repealed by the Legislature.” These provisions furthered the
intent of our State Constitution, “to make the government for the state complete and
operative from the very time of the taking effect of the Constitution”, Lewis, 72 P. at 390,
by unequivocally linking State laws to Territorial laws, allowing our new State to begin
operation with proven, functional laws.
In fact, in considering article XXIV, section 2, the argument can be made that the
requirement of continued prosecution of these “indictable misdemeanors” is implicitly
required in art. I, §13, and explicitly required in article XXIV, section 2, with the former
provision merely adding prosecution by information to the prosecutorial repertoire.
The plain meaning of art. I, §13, and related constitutional provisions, refers to
laws of the Territory of Utah. The State’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
b. The intent of the drafters of article I, section 13, was for this provision to
refer to Utah Territorial law, thereby requiring preliminary hearings to
be held in all cases of class A misdemeanors prosecuted by information.
Although the starting point of interpretation of constitutional analysis is the text
itself, additional clarification may be gained from analyzing historical evidence of the
state of the law when our Constitution was drafted as well as the debates at the 1895 Utah
Constitutional Convention. American Bush, 2006 UT at ¶12; Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at
1072-73.

8

The drafters of the Utah Constitution intended art. I, §13, to refer to territorial
laws. This intent is clearly seen in the following exchange from the twentieth day of
Utah’s Constitutional Convention:
Section 13 of the preamble and declaration of rights was then read as
follows:
Section 13. Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictments shall be prosecuted by information, after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without
such examination or with commitment. The grand jury may consist
of any number of members, of not less than five nor more than
fifteen, as the judge of the court may order. A grand jury may be
drawn and summoned whenever in the opinion of the judge of the
district, public interest demands one.
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I only wish to say before the committee begin
firing at this section that it is almost the same as in the states of Michigan,
Wisconsin, Washington, Colorado and California, and in all those states I
am informed that this system has worked extremely well.
Mr. Bowdle offered the following as a, substitute for section 13:
No person shall be held to answer in a criminal case except on
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate or on
an indictment with or without examination and commitment. The
grand jury shall consist of seven members and shall be drawn and
summoned only when in the opinion of the judge of the district,
public interest demands one.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). .1[sic.] think the only difference is in the number of
grand jurors.
Mr. BOWDLE. Practically that is true. The only objection that I have to the
first part of the section is “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment,” that is taken from the California revised or new constitution,
and undoubtedly they had in mind their old constitution. Now, we have no
organic existence as a State until this Constitution is adopted and we are
admitted, and we are not looking back to a time when, as a state, we were
prosecuting crimes in a different way, and it seems to me that it is
preferable in that respect. It does not change the substance a particle, but it

9

reads here, “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment.[sic.] Heretofore prosecuted where? Not in the State of Utah.
Mr. EICHNOR. In the Territory.
Mr. BOWDLE. That is the only point I have.
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 1895, 313 (1898). 4
Mr. Bowdle’s intention, as is ours, was to clarify to what the phrase “offenses
heretofore required” referred. The answer from Mr. Eichnor was clear and to the point:
Offenses prosecuted “[i]n the Territory [of Utah].” Id. The discussion then continued:
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, the provision as contained here is in the
constitution of the state of Washington. They meant under the territorial
system. Section 25 of the Washington constitution provided that offenses
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, and so on_[sic.]so that
the committee is right and this ought to be adopted as it is.
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, the only objection I have to this section is that
it provides that all criminal cases be required to be prosecuted by
indictment. There are criminal cases below felonies where they were not
required to be prosecuted by indictment, and I think the language as it is
now is better, “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment,” showing there are some offenses heretofore not required to be
prosecuted by indictment, and I prefer the section as it is now to the
substitute offered to that by the gentleman. I am free to admit, however,
that the juries should be fixed at seven.
Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added). Mr. Bowdle’s substitute, which would have required the
prosecution of all offenses by information, was ultimately rejected in favor of existing
territorial requirements discussed above. Id. At no point during the debate over art. I,
§13, was the United States Constitution, much less the Fifth Amendment, mentioned.

4

The Official Report of the Proceedings and Debate of the convention: 1895 may be
found at the following address:
http://www.le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/utconstconv.htm
10

The drafters intent that art. I, §13, refer to territorial laws was clearly stated during the
debates over the provision.
That the drafters intended art. I, §13, to refer to territorial laws is further supported
by the state constitutions on which this provision is based. During the debates, the
Constitutions of California and Washington were described as having similar provisions
to art. I, §13, in that they both referred to the laws in existence prior to their enactment.
In 1895, the “revised or new” Constitution of the State of California referred to
“[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment . . .” Cal. Const. art. I,
§8. 5 Mr. Bowdle’s reference to California’s new Constitution specified that it “had in
mind [California’s] old constitution.” 6 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of
the Convention: 1895, 313 (1898).
Next, the Constitution of the State of Washington was discussed. As with
California, the Washington Constitution then contained language identical to that of art. I,
§13, of our State Constitution. Id. As Mr. Maloney stated, this provision “meant under
the territorial system.” Id.
As shown by these debates, the intent of the drafters of the Utah Constitution was
that art. I, §13, refer to territorial laws. To do so, the drafters considered other
constitutions which successfully referred to prior or territorial laws, and copied their
language. Id. To the drafters of Utah’s Constitution, the answer to the question of what
5

California’s current constitution reads “Felonies shall be prosecuted as provided by
law, either by indictment or, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, by
information.” Cal. Const. art. I, §14.
6
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, . . .
unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” Cal. Const. art. I, §8 (1849).
11

“offenses heretofore required” referred was clear: Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment “[i]n the Territory.” Id.
The drafters’ intent that art. I, §13, refer to territorial law is also seen through other
provisions of the Utah Constitution. Consider, for example, article VIII, section 1, of our
State Constitution. This provision vested the judicial power of the state “in a Supreme
Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other
courts as the legislature by statute may establish.” Utah Const. art. VIII, §1. Although
similar to article III, section 1, of the United States Constitution, the drafters’ intent of
article VIII, section 1, was not to echo the Federal Constitution but to streamline exiting
territorial laws which provided for a Supreme Court, district court, probate court and
justices’ court. See Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. II, §3001 (1888); Official Report of the
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 1895, 492-93, 1316 (1898) (to make courts
of the State of Utah more efficient, the judiciary committee eliminated probate courts).
During the debates on article VIII, the onus was not on what was required by the
Federal Constitution, but on what had worked under territorial law. The Federal
Constitution was not discussed during these debates. Only territorial laws, the needs of
the counties, and the effectiveness of existing territorial laws were discussed. See
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 1895, 1315-17, 1321,
1323, 1327-28 (1898).
This omission does not suggest a lack of respect for, or consideration of, the
United States Constitution, but it demonstrates the drafters’ understanding that the laws
of the Territory of Utah had already passed constitutional muster. Organic Act, Section
12

VI; Norman, 52 P. at 988. For the drafters of our State Constitution, there was no need to
mess with a good thing. Rather than start from scratch, they focused on refining
territorial laws while taking advantage of new opportunities, so as “to make the
government for the state complete and operative from the very time of the taking effect of
the Constitution.” Lewis, 72 P. at 390. For this purpose, art. I, §13, was patterned on
provisions from other constitutions which successfully referred to territorial, or previous,
laws.
Art. I, §13, was drafted with the intent that it refer to the laws of the Territory of
Utah, which clearly required the prosecution of classes of offenses now known as class A
misdemeanors by indictment. Art. I, §13, therefore, requires preliminary hearings to be
held in cases of class A misdemeanors which are prosecuted by information.
c. This Court has consistently interpreted article I, section 13, as referring to
Utah Territorial law, thereby requiring preliminary hearings to be held in
all cases of class A misdemeanors prosecuted by information.
That art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution refers to territorial laws is a concept
which this Court has clearly understood and discussed since our State Constitution was
ratified. It is, in fact, a concept which this Court has relied upon as a fact in reaching its
holdings on other issues. An analysis of this Court’s discussions of art. I, §13, show that
the phrase “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” refers to
territorial laws.
In State v. Nelson, this Court held that a defendant who was convicted of having
committed the crime of carnal knowledge of a female under 18 and over 13 years of age,
an indictable misdemeanor, was denied a fair trial because the date of the offense alleged
13

at trial was different from that which was contained in the information, and presented at
the preliminary hearing. 176 P. 860, 864 (Utah 1918).
In reaching its conclusion, the Nelson Court noted that art. I, §13, of the Utah
Constitution was
[P]lain and unequivocal. Its meaning cannot be misunderstood by any one
who reads it with ordinary care. It means that a felony or an indictable
misdemeanor, after the adoption of the Constitution, could only be
prosecuted in one of two ways: (1) By information after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, unless an examination be waived by the
accused with the consent of the state; and (2) by indictment with or without
such examination and commitment.
Id. at 861.
In State v. McIntyre, a defendant convicted in district court of the crime of
conspiracy to commit extortion, an indictable misdemeanor, moved to vacate his
conviction, arguing that the district court erred in holding a preliminary examination on
his case. 66 P.2d 879, 880-81 (Utah 1937). Article VIII, section 21, of the Utah
Constitution 7, he argued, limited the power of district court judges to hold preliminary
hearings only in cases of felonies. Id. at 881.
The McIntyre Court rejected this argument, finding that article VIII, §section 21,
said “may hold,” which on its face is not a prohibition on holding preliminary
examinations on cases other than felonies. Id. In reaching this decision, the McIntyre
Court noted that because conspiracy to commit extortion “was an offense required to be
prosecuted by indictment” prior to the adoption of the State Constitution, under art. I,
7

“Judges of the Supreme Court, District Courts, and justices of the peace, shall be
conservators of the peace, and may hold preliminary examinations in cases of felony.”
Utah Const. art. VIII, §21 (repealed 1984)
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§13, the offense may “now be prosecuted by information after examination and
commitment by a magistrate.” Id. at 881-82.
In State v. Johnson, this Court was asked to decide the proper venue for the
commencement of a “non-indictable misdemeanor.” 8 114 P.2d 1034, 1039, 1042 (Utah
1941) superseded by statute, Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), (d) (1992). In his concurrence
Justice Pratt noted that territorial laws regarding the jurisdiction of justice courts were
codified as State law by article VIII, section 8, of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 1043
(Pratt, J. concurring); Utah Const. art. VIII, §8 (amended 1984).
Justice Pratt further noted that the codification of territorial laws in the Utah
Constitution is also seen in art. I, §13, which “recognizes that there were certain offenses
which were not required to be prosecuted by indictment” and were subject to prosecution
before a Justice of the Peace. Id. at 1044. Laws indicating that non-indictable
misdemeanors “were not to be initiated in the District Court,” were passed to conform “to
section 13 of Article 1 of the Constitution” which “deal[s] with felonies and indictable
misdemeanors but not with misdemeanors.” Id.
Returning to the case at hand, the State’s response discounts the cases cited to in
Mr. Hernandez’s petition because their analysis of art. I, §13, was deficient, and mostly
found in dicta. The State fails to acknowledge, however, that prior to its response, all of
the interested parties had conceded that art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution referred to
territorial law. (R. 75-78; 160-62; 168-73; 204-211; 219-28; 236-44).
8

The Johnson Court ultimately held that although the district court had original
jurisdiction over all criminal cases, the proper venue for the case was in “Justices’ court.”
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Utah 1941).
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The sufficiency of the above analysis aside (all of the cases cited above were
referenced in Mr. Hernandez’s initial petition), the State is correct in its assertion that
most references to art. I, §13, of our State Constitution are contained in dicta. But the
State misses the significance of this fact.
Never before has the fact that art. I, §13, refers to territorial laws been challenged
or questioned. The State’s response is the first time in over one-hundred fourteen years
that the argument has been made that art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution refers
exclusively to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and ignores Utah
Territorial law.
The lack of analysis complained of by the State is not due to a mistake which has
spanned over one-hundred fourteen years, but it is because it has always been known,
accepted and understood that art. I, §13, of our State Constitution refers to Utah
Territorial Law.
The prosecution of misdemeanors punishable by fines and/or imprisonment in
excess of the jurisdictional limits of Justice Courts (currently fines in excess of one
thousand dollars, imprisonment of up to one year, or both) by information, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, was once common in the State of Utah. 9

9

See e.g., State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Utah 1979) (discussing the procedure for
prosecuting indictable and non-indictable misdemeanors out of a single incident); State v.
Cooley, 575 P.2d 693, 693 (Utah 1978) (Defendant charged with failure to stop vehicle at
the command of a police officer, “an indictable misdemeanor triable only on information
or indictment in the district court”); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State Tax Commission of
Utah, 504 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1972) (Failure to file necessary reports with the State Tax
Commission of Utah was an indictable misdemeanor) (citing 41-11-21 U.C.A. 1953);
State v. Callahan, 488 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1971) (Defendant charged with willfully and
16

But sometime after 1980 these offenses stopped being properly prosecuted, leading us to
the case at hand where Mr. Hernandez’s request for a preliminary examination was
denied, even though he has been charged with numerous “indictable,” or class A,
misdemeanors.
For these reasons, State’s argument is without merit.

unlawfully resisting a police officer in discharging or attempting to discharge the duty of
his office in making a lawful arrest, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Boone, 483 P.2d
238 (Utah 1971) (Defendant charged with resisting an officer, an indictable
misdemeanor); State v. Brennan, 371 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1962) (Defendant charged with
driving while intoxicated and injuring another person in a reckless or negligent manner,
an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1960)
(Defendant charged with negligent homicide, an indictable misdemeanor); State v.
Sandman, 286 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1955) (“’Every person who willfully resists, delays
or obstructs any public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge, any duty of his
office * * * is punishable by fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year, or by both.’ thus constituting an indictable misdemeanor”)
(citation omitted); Ogden City v. Adams, 245 P.2d 851, 852 (Utah 1952) (Provision of the
Liquor Control Act, Chap. 43, Laws of Utah 1935, U.C.A. 1943, 46-0-43 et seq., which
required district attorneys to represent the State in criminal actions tried in the district
court referred to indictable misdemeanors and felonies); State v. Stewart, 171 P.2d 383,
385 (Utah 1946) (A person convicted of a second offense of “drunken driving” is
punishable as an indictable misdemeanor, in which a defendant so charged would be
entitled to a preliminary hearing, and the case would be triable in the district court); State
v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1939) (Defendant charged with common nuisance,
under the Liquor Control Act, an indictable misdemeanor); In re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969,
970 (Utah 1943) (crime of criminal conspiracy an indictable misdemeanor); State v.
McIntyre, 66 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1937) (Defendant convicted in district court of the
crime of conspiracy to commit extortion, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Cragun,
20 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah 1933) (Defendant charged with practicing obstetrics without a
license, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Olsen, 289 P. 92, 93 (Utah 1930) (The
crime of false imprisonment is included within the crime of kidnapping, the former an
indictable misdemeanor and the latter a felony); State v. Hale, 263 P. 86, 87 (Utah 1927)
((Defendant charged with treating human ailments without a license, an indictable
misdemeanor not triable before city courts).
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II. IN CASES PROSECUTED BY INFORMATION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 13,
OF UTAH’S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES MAGISTRATES TO CONSIDER
AND WEIGH ACTUAL EVIDENCE AND THE SWORN TESTIMONY OF
WITNESSES BEFORE THE ACCUSED MAY BE BOUND OVER FOR
TRIAL
Art. I, §13, states that in “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment” an “examination and commitment by a magistrate” must be held, “unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State . . .” Utah Const. art.
I, §13 (emphasis added). In its response, the State argues that the probable cause
statement included with informations filed to commence criminal prosecutions of cases
involving felonies and class A misdemeanors, satisfies the requirements of art. I, §13.
The State’s argument is flawed on its face, and in its substance.
On its face, the State fails to explain how the accused can waive the examination
of a sworn affidavit that is filed and read by the magistrate before the defendant’s
involvement with the case. 10 Art. I, §13, clearly suggests that there would be
circumstances in which the State and defendant would agree to waive their preliminary
hearing and bind the matter over for arraignment and trial. For this to happen, the
defendant would have to be involved with the case prior to making a decision regarding
the examination and commitment by a magistrate. Because the State’s alternative
argument ignores this reality, it is without merit.

10

If the State’s argument is true, however, and an information “sworn to by a person
having reason to believe the offense has been committed” satisfies the requirements of
article I, section 13, our criminal justice system, as currently constituted, violates the
rights of the accused in every case of a felony or indictable misdemeanor in that the
accused is never given the opportunity to ask that the examination and commitment be
waived before it is reviewed by a magistrate.
18

Additionally, the State’s argument that today’s preliminary hearing is a legislative
gift, and not required by our State Constitution, ignores the constitutional requirements of
the “examination and commitment by a magistrate.”
This Court has taken great strides to clarify the standards required at different
stages of the prosecution of criminal cases. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶18, 137 P.3d
787. Thanks to these efforts it is now well understood that “probable cause” is the
standard required to issue an arrest warrant and to bind a criminal complaint over for
trial. See, id. (“[T]he probable cause that the prosecution must establish in a preliminary
hearing ... is the same as the probable cause that the prosecution must show to obtain an
arrest warrant.”); see also State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶16, 20 P.3d 300 (“[A]t both the
arrest warrant and the preliminary hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant committed it”) (citation omitted). Whether seeking an arrest warrant, or asking
a criminal complaint to be bound over for trial, sufficient evidence must be presented
before a magistrate to allow a determination of probable cause.
In its response, the State confuses and misapplies the evidentiary requirements for
issuing an arrest warrant with the evidentiary requirements for bindover, arguing that the
evidence required to determine probable cause to issue an arrest warrant is all that is
required under our State Constitution to bind a case over for trial. When viewed in its
proper light, this argument is without merit.
Regarding the initiation of criminal cases, our rules state that “[u]nless otherwise
provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall
19

be commenced by the filing of an information 11 or the return of an indictment.” 12 Utah R.
Crim. P. 5(a) (emphasis added). Although currently called an “information,” historically,
the document filed to commence a criminal prosecution was called a “complaint.” 13 See
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 466 n.2 (Utah 1991) (under Utah’s current statutory
scheme, informations have replaced complaints in pre-bindover situations). This
changing terminology has resulted in some confusion regarding the requirements for the
prosecution of felonies and indictable misdemeanors.
The basic requirements for the initiation of criminal prosecutions have remained
consistent throughout the history of Utah. Under territorial law, a criminal prosecution
began with a complaint, filed before a magistrate, which was based on, and stated, the
information and belief that an offense was committed, and that the accused had

11

Although Utah law identifies the document filed to initiate a criminal prosecution and
secure the appearance of the accused (by warrant or summons) as an “information,” in
cases of felonies and class A misdemeanors, this document does not become an
“information,” as required by our State constitution, until a magistrate has examined the
evidence, found probable cause that the accused has committed the crimes alleged in the
complaint and ordered the accused to be bound over for trial before the district court.
Utah Const. art. I, §13.
12
Because the issue before this Court is whether a preliminary hearing is required in
cases of class A misdemeanors being prosecuted by information, the requirements for
prosecuting such cases by indictment under Utah law will not be thoroughly analyzed in
this response.
13
In 1935, the Utah legislature modified the procedure whereby felonies and indictable
misdemeanors were filed by enacting “section §105-21-5 (Chapter 118), Laws of Utah,
1935 which by implication says that an information may be used for an offense in which
there has been no preliminary hearings. In such a case an oath must be taken to the
information. This in effect makes the information a complaint.” State v. Johnson, 114
P.2d 1034, 1044 (Utah 1941) (Pratt, J. concurring). This enactment is the source of this
change in terminology.
20

committed it. U.S. v. Eldredge, 13 P. 673, 675-76 (Utah. Terr. 1887) appeal dismissed,
145 U.S. 636 (1887).
Following statehood, criminal prosecutions were required to begin with a
“statement in writing” made to a magistrate which stated: “(1) The name of the accused,
if known; *** (2) the county in which the offense was committed; (3) the general name
of the crime or public offense; (4) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
crime or public offense named.” State v. Anderson, 101 P. 385, 386 (Utah 1909) (citation
omitted).
Currently, Utah law requires criminal prosecutions to begin with the filing of an
information which has been “sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense
has been committed,” Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a), and to state the offense being prosecuted in
terms “sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge.” Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b).
As stated in Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the purpose of the
affidavit filed with the information is to give the magistrate sufficient information to
determine if “there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the accused has committed it.” If the initial affidavit contains enough information
for this determination to be made, the magistrate is required to “issue either a warrant for
the arrest or a summons for the appearance of the accused.” Utah R. Crim. P. 6(a).
The purpose of the complaint, or information, is to secure the appearance of the
accused before a magistrate, and to notify the accused of the charges against them.
Following this initial filing and determination of probable cause, in felonies and
class A misdemeanors an “examination and commitment by a magistrate” must be held to
21

determine if the accused should be required to stand trial on the charges. Utah Const. art.
I, §13; see also Anderson, 101 P. at 387 (in cases of felonies or indictable misdemeanors,
following the filing of the complaint before a magistrate, the case then proceeded to an
examination of the evidence, after which an information is filed).
The examination and commitment required by article I, section 13, of the Utah
Constitution, “was designed, to some extent, to accomplish the purpose of a presentment
by a grand jury14 under the law as it existed before, in protecting a party against being
subjected to the indignity of a public trial for an offense before probable cause has been
established against him by evidence under oath.” State v. Spencer, 49 P. 302, 304 (Utah
1897) (citation omitted). Today, the “examination and commitment” is known as a
preliminary hearing.
In Utah, preliminary hearings are adversarial in nature, and provide defendants
“the ‘opportunity to attach the prosecution’s evidence and to present any affirmative
defenses.’ Although the hearing is not a trial per se, it is not an ex parte proceeding nor
one-sided determination of probable cause . . .” Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶31 (emphasis
added) (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980)). The prosecution
must present evidence “sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant

14

The function of a grand jury cannot be satisfied by a sworn affidavit presented to them
by the prosecuting attorney. Grand juries consider and weigh actual evidence. People v.
Robinson, 21 P. 403, 404 (Utah Terr. 1889) (witnesses must be called to testify at grand
jury proceedings); People v. Greenwell, 13 P. 89, 91 (Utah Terr. 1887) (grand juries are
required to weigh all evidence submitted to them, and when they believe other evidence
may “explain away the charge,” they are required to order the prosecuting attorney to
produce such evidence).
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committed the charged crime.” Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶17 (citation omitted); see also State
v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Utah 1988).
For nearly the first century of our State’s existence the accused were guaranteed
the “entire panoply of [rights guaranteed by Utah’s Confrontation Clause] at the
preliminary examination.” State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶14, 218 P.3d 590 (citation
omitted). In 1995, however, article I, section 12, was amended to limit Utah’s
Confrontation Clause by adding a second paragraph that allowed the use of reliable
hearsay evidence, as defined by statute or rule 15, “in whole or in part at any preliminary
examination to determine probable cause . . .” Even under this diminished constitutional
standard, an information that contains no evidence other than having been “sworn to by a
person having reason to believe the offense has been committed” would not be
admissible at a preliminary. Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a).
The primary purpose for the heightened evidentiary requirements of preliminary
hearings is to provide the magistrate sufficient information to allow her to ferret out
groundless prosecutions before they go to trial, thereby relieving the accused of the
substantial degradation and expenses incurred in a modern criminal trial when the
charges against the accused are unwarranted, or the evidence insufficient. Virgin, 2006
UT at ¶¶19-20, ¶33; Anderson, Utah, 612 P.2d at 783-84. 16 This information must be
sufficient to allow the magistrate to “observe and assess witness demeanor and

15

Reliable hearsay is defined by Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
See also, e.g., Utah Const. art. I, §1 (“All men have the inherent and inalienable right
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties”), id. at §7 (“No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law”).
16
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credibility” to determine whether the “evidence is wholly incapable of supporting a
reasonable belief as to a part of the prosecution’s case.” Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶31
(citations omitted).
Preliminary hearings give defendants an opportunity to “introduce evidence which
tends to exonerate him, or to explain away the charge.” Anderson, 101 P. at 386; see also
Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶31 (preliminary hearings give defendants the opportunity to present
affirmative defenses). They also “enable the defendant to inform himself of the nature of
the accusation made against him . . . and [to be] given an opportunity to fully inform
himself of the facts and circumstances upon which the state relies to sustain the charge,
and be prepared to meet it when he is brought to trial.” Anderson, 101 P. at 386 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). These hearings also serve as “a means to discover and
preserve evidence favorable to his defense.” Kearns-Tribune Corp., Publisher of Salt
Lake Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 520 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). Finally, in
cases where the defendant ultimately pleads guilty, these hearings may “provide the only
occasion for a public hearing of the prosecution’s evidence.” Id.
These purposes and rights cannot be secured by a sworn statement on a piece of
paper filed by the state to commence a criminal prosecution. Although such sparse
evidence is sufficient to initiate a criminal case, the suggestion that it is all that is
required under our State Constitution for preliminary hearings is contrary to our laws and
precedent.
Ultimately, the State’s argument that a sworn affidavit is sufficient evidence for a
preliminary hearing was decided by this Court over one hundred years ago. In State v.
24

Anderson, this Court found that “a complaint which states the name of the crime charged,
the time and place of its commission, the name of the accused, if known, and sets out in
general terms the acts or omissions constituting the public offense or crime charged” is
“lacking in other averments which would be necessary in an indictment or information.”
101 P. at 386.
It is for this reason that the arguments raised on appeal by the State are without
merit. The preliminary examinations discussed in Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure embody the requirements of art. I, §13, of our State Constitution.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, an analysis of the plain text of art. I, §13, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, shows that this provision refers to territorial laws, and therefore requires
preliminary hearings in cases of class A misdemeanors prosecuted by information. This
conclusion is supported by the stated intent of the drafters of our State Constitution, as
well as this Court’s precedent.
Additionally, the purposes of a preliminary hearing, as required by art. I, §13, are
not satisfied by a complaint filed with an affidavit sworn to by someone having reason to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the accused committed it.
Mr. Hernandez asks that this Court order the district court to grant his request for a
preliminary hearing, and restore the prosecution of class A misdemeanors to the process
required by the Utah Constitution, and practiced throughout most of our State’s history.
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